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Many system security departments treat users as a security risk to be controlled.  The 
general consensus is that most users are careless and unmotivated when it comes to system 
security.  In a recent study, we found that users may indeed compromise computer security 
mechanisms, such as password authentication, both knowing and unknowingly.  A closer 
analysis, however, revealed that such behavior is often caused by the way in which security 
mechanisms are implemented, and users’ lack of knowledge. We argue that to change this 
state of affairs, security departments need to communicate more with users, and adopt a user-
centered design approach. 
Introduction  
Confidentiality is an important aspect of computer security.  It is dependent on 
authentication mechanisms, such as passwords, to safeguard access to information [9]. 
Traditionally, authentication procedures are divided into two stages; identification (User ID), 
to identify the user and authentication, to verify that the user is the legitimate owner of the 
ID.  It is the latter stage that requires a secret password. To date, research on password 
security has focused on designing technical mechanisms to protect access to systems; the 
usability of these mechanisms has rarely been investigated.  Hitchings [8] and Davis & Price 
[4] argue that this narrow perspective has produced security mechanisms which are, in 
practice, less effective than they are generally assumed to be.  Since security mechanisms are 
designed, implemented, applied and breached by people, human factors should be considered 
in their design.  It seems that currently, hackers pay more attention to the human link in the 
security chain than security designers do, e.g. by using social engineering to obtain 
passwords.   
The key element in password security is the crackability of a password combination. 
Davies & Ganesan [3] argue that an adversary’s ability to crack passwords is larger than 
usually believed. System-generated passwords are essentially the optimal security 
approach; however, user-generated password are potentially more memorable and 
thus less likely to be disclosed (e.g. because users have write them down). The US 
Federal Information Processing Standards [5] suggest several criteria for assuring different 
levels of password security.  Password  composition, for example, relates the size of a 
character set from which a password has been chosen to its level of security.  An alpha-
numeric password is therefore more secure than one composed of letters alone.  Short 
password lifetime - i.e. changing passwords frequently - is suggested as reducing the risk 
associated with undetected compromised passwords.  Finally, password  ownership, in 
particular individual ownership, is suggest to: 
 
•  increase individual accountability; 
•  reduce illicit usage; 
•  allow for an establishment of system usage audit trails; 
•  reduce frequent password changes due to group membership fluctuations.  
 
There is evidence that many password users do not comply with these suggested 
rules.  DeAlvare [1] found that once a password is chosen, a user is unlikely to change it until 
it has been shown to be compromised. Users were also found to construct passwords that 
contained as few characters as possible [2]. These observations cannot be disputed, but the 
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insecure needs to be challenged.   
The study 
A web-based questionnaire was used to obtain initial quantitative and qualitative data 
on user behaviors and perceptions relating to password systems. The questionnaire focused 
mainly on password-related user behaviors (password construction, frequency of use, 
password recall and work practices) and in particular memorability issues.  139 responses 
were received, approximately half from employees of Organization A (a technology 
company), the other half from users in organizations throughout the world. There was a wide 
range of frequency and duration of password use among respondents.  The questionnaire was 
followed by 30 semi-structured in-depth interviews with a variety of users in Organization A 
and Organization B (a company in the construction sector). Interview questions covered 
password generation and recall along with systems and organizational issues raised by 
respondents in the questionnaire.  The interview format allowed participants to introduce new 
issues to the discussion which they regarded as related to password usage. Results from the 
open-ended sections of the questionnaire were brought together with results from the in-depth 
interviews to give a wide sample for analysis. 
The analysis, using a social science based method called grounded theory [10], 
provided a framework of issues affecting user behavior, with a step-by-step account of 
password usage problems and possible intervention points.  Four major factors influencing 
effective password usage were identified within the framework. 
1) multiple passwords 
2) password content 
3) perceived compatibility with work practices 
4) users’ perceptions of organizational security and information sensitivity.  
As the findings from the study are too numerous to discuss in detail here, key points 
of interest from each factor are presented.  
Many users have to remember multiple passwords, i.e. use different passwords for 
different applications and/or change passwords frequently due to password expiry 
mechanisms.  Having a large number of passwords reduces their memorability and increases 
insecure work-practices, such as writing passwords down - 50% of questionnaire respondents 
wrote their passwords down in one form or another
1. One employee emphasized this 
relationship when he said that “… because I was forced into changing it every month I had to 
write it down”. Poor password design (e.g. using password as their password) was also found 
to be related to multiple passwords.  “Constantly changing passwords” were blamed by 
another employee for producing “… very simple choices which are easy to guess, or break, 
within seconds of using 'Cracker' 
2.  Hence there is no security.” It is interesting to note here 
that users, again, perceive their behavior to be caused by a mechanism designed to increase 
security.  At the same time, users often devise their own procedures to increase password 
memorability and security.  Some users devise their own method for creating memorable 
multiple passwords through related passwords (linking their passwords via some common 
element) - 50% of questionnaire respondents employed this method
1.  Many users try to 
comply with security rules by varying elements in these linked passwords (e.g. tom1, tom2, 
tom3).  However, rather than improving memorability and security, this method actually 
decreases password memorability due to within-list interference [11], causing users to write 
down passwords which, of course, compromises password security levels. 
Users’ knowledge of  what constitutes secure password content (the character content 
of the password) was inadequate.  Without feedback from security experts, users created their 
                                                 
1 The response was the same for all users who answered these questions - the other 
50% of users left these questions blank. 
2 A password dictionary checker 
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names are the most vulnerable form of password, but many users do not understand how 
password cracking works. Members of the security department in Organization A were 
appalled to discover that one of their employees suggested: 
 
“I would have thought that if you picked something like your wife's 
Christian name or something then the chances of a complete stranger 
guessing *********, in my case, were pretty remote.” 
 
At the same time, restrictions introduced to create more secure password content may produce 
less memorable passwords, leading to increased password disclosure (because users write 
passwords down).  Many users circumvent such restrictions to produce passwords they find 
easy to remember.  However, the resulting passwords tend to be less secure in terms of 
content.  Even worse, having to circumvent security procedures lowers users’ regard for the 
overall security arrangements in the organization, which in turn, increases password 
disclosure.  
Another new finding of this study is the importance of compatibility between work 
practices and password procedures.  Organization A employed individually owned passwords 
for group working which users perceived as incompatible with their working procedures 
(advocating shared passwords for themselves).  Users in Organization B experienced this 
incompatibility in reverse: they emphatically rejected the departmental policy of group 
passwords for individual personal information (such as email).  
One reason for Organization A’s adoption of individual passwords was to establish 
the users perception of accountability through audit trails of system usage.  We found, 
however, that most users had not considered the possibility that their actions might be tracked.  
It is telling that the only user who made the connection cheerfully revealed that he avoided 
being tracked by using other users’ passwords for certain transactions, so that “…if there’s 
any problem, they get it in the neck, not you”. 
The study clearly showed that users are not sufficiently informed about security 
issues.  This causes them to construct their own model of possible security threats and the 
importance of security and these are often wildly inaccurate.  Users tend to be guided by 
what they actually see - or don’t.  As one manager stated: “I don't think that hacking is a 
problem - I've had no visibility of hacking that may go on. None at all.” Another employee 
observed that “… security problems are more by word of mouth …”.  This lack of awareness 
was corroborated by results from the Web questionnaire.  A complex interaction between 
users’ perceptions of organizational security and information sensitivity  was identified.   
Users identified certain systems as worthy of secure password practices, whilst others were 
perceived as “not important enough”.  Without any feedback from the organization, users 
rated confidential information about individuals (personnel files, email) as sensitive; but 
commercially sensitive information (such as customer databases and financial data) was often 
seen as less sensitive.  Some users stated that they appreciated the printed document 
classifications (e.g. Confidential, Not for Circulation), indicating their need for information 
sensitivity guidance and rules for levels of protection in on-line documentation. 
Two main problems in password usage were identified from these results: system 
factors, which users perceive they are forced to circumvent, and external factors, which are 
perceived as incompatible with working procedures. Both these problems are due to a lack of 
communication between security departments and users:  users do not understand security 
issues, whilst security departments lack an understanding of users’ perceptions, tasks and 
needs.  The result is that security departments typecast users as “inherently insecure”: at best, 
they are a security risk which needs to be controlled and managed, at worst they are the 
enemy within.  Users, on the other hand, perceive many security mechanisms as laborious and 
unnecessary - an overhead which gets in the way of their real work.  In the following sections 
we discuss the cause of the problem and how to it address it. 
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Parker [9] points out that a major doctrine in password security, adopted from the 
military, is the need-to-know  principle.  The assumption is that the more known about a 
security mechanism, the easier it is to attack; restricting access to this knowledge therefore 
increases security.  Users are often told as little as possible because security departments see 
them as “inherently unsafe”.  One clear finding from this study is that inadequate knowledge 
of password procedures, content and cracking lies at the root of users’ “insecure” behaviors.  
Both Organizations A and B had replaced system-generated passwords with user-
generated ones, thus shifting the responsibility for creating secure passwords to the users. 
However, known rules for creating secure passwords were rarely communicated to users.  
Users were asked to complete a skilled design job without adequate training or on-line 
feedback. This problem was compounded by the security departments implicit need-to-know 
policy on an information’s sensitivity, potential security breaches and risks.  Users perceived 
threats to the organization to be low because of their own judgments of the information’s lack 
of importance or visible threats.  This misunderstanding led to the general misconception that 
password cracking is done on a “personal” basis, with the perception of risks decreasing as 
they perceived their insignificance in the system. Organization A decided to provide on-line 
support and feedback to users in the process of password design; a cracker program was 
installed, with constructive advice provided on secure password design for all users whose 
password was cracked. On-line information on threats to password security (“Monthly 
security report and update”) is also being considered. 
Finally, we found that users do not understand the authentication process, confusing 
the user identification (ID) and password sections.  Many users assumed IDs were another 
form of password to be secured and recalled in the same manner. This increased users’ 
perception of the mental workload associated with passwords which then reduced their 
motivation to comply with the suggested behavior. The ID’s, within the organizations 
investigated, could have caused this misconception by having no standardized format for 
different applications and often being non-words without meaning. In response to this finding, 
Organization A decided to introduce a single sign-on for users with a high number of 
passwords and is considering the use of smart cards as an identification mechanism. User 
authentication using physical attributes (biometrics) do not require ID recall, and thus 
offer a mechanism with reduced mental overheads.  The main drawback of these 
methods is the cost of both installation and monitoring.  Organisations also have to 
consider whether the level and consequences of “false positive” alarms are acceptable 
to their business.  Finally, their is a question of how to combine the specialist 
equipment required for such methods with remote access to systems, which is an 
increasing requirement in an age of  teleworking, hotdesking and nomad 
professionals. 
Security needs user-centered design 
  Insufficient communication with users produces a lack of a user-centered design in 
security mechanisms. Many of these mechanisms create overheads for users, or require 
unworkable user behavior.  It is therefore hardly surprising to find, that many users try to 
circumvent such mechanisms. 
Requiring users to have a large number of passwords (for multiple applications and 
change regimes) was found to create serious usability problems.  Although change regimes 
are employed to reduce the impact of an undetected security breach, our findings suggest that 
they reduce the overall password security in an organization.  Users required to change their 
passwords frequently produce less secure password content (because they have to be more 
memorable) and disclose their passwords more frequently. Many of the users felt forced into 
these circumventing procedures, which subsequently decreased their own security motivation. 
Ultimately, this produces a spiraling decline in users’ password behavior (“I cannot remember 
  4my password, I have to write it down, everyone knows it’s on a post-it in my drawer, so I 
might as well stick it on the screen and tell everyone who wants to know”.) Organization A 
was understandably worried to discover such attitudes, as social engineers rely on password 
disclosure, low security awareness and motivation to breach security mechanisms.  The cost 
associated with re-setting passwords in Organization A was one of the visible consequences 
which prompted the study reported here.  Recognizing the impact that cognitive overheads 
introduced by some password mechanisms have on users’ security motivation, the security 
and human factors groups in Organization A have joined forces to develop a user-centered 
approach to the design of password and other security mechanisms.  Such approaches will 
also have to take into account that the number of passwords outside work is constantly 
growing (banking, shopping, subscriptions to on-line services), thus increasing the cognitive 
load of users. 
Motivating users  
A technical bias towards security mechanism has produced a simplistic approach to 
user authentication: restricting access to data by identification and authentication of a user.  
This simplistic approach may work well in military environments, but limits usable solutions 
to the security problems of modern organizations which seek to encourage work practices 
such as teamwork and shared responsibility.  Such organizations require support for trust and 
information sharing.  The authoritarian approach has also led to security departments’ 
reluctance to communicate with users with regard to work practices. It has been suggested by 
the US Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) [5] that individual ownership of 
passwords increases accountability and decreases illicit usage of passwords, because of the 
possibility of audit trailing - a by-product of authentication. However, both of these 
assumption rely on users perceptions which, as previously mentioned, do not always comply 
to those of the security departments. FIPS [5] also suggest that shared passwords for groups 
are insecure.  This study has identified that if users perceive they are using shared passwords 
for work carried out in a team this may increase their perceptions of group responsibility and 
accountability. If a password mechanism is incompatible with users’ work practices, they 
perceive the security mechanism as “not sensible” and circumvent it (e.g. by disclosing their 
password to other group members).  This can lead to a perception that all password 
mechanisms are “pointless”, circumventing all of them and decreasing overall security.  This 
does not mean that individual passwords should not be used in organizations with team-based 
working; it is worth considering protecting access to shared information with a shared 
password whilst leaving individual passwords for individual activities.  The increased mental 
load of an additional shared password may cause less problems than the spiraling decline in 
security behavior caused by “incompatible” mechanisms. 
  It is important to challenge the view that users are never motivated to behave in a 
secure manner.  Our results show that the majority of users were security-conscious, as long 
as they perceive the need for these behaviors, e.g. because of obvious external threats or the 
perceived sensitivity of the information protected.  These findings are supported by research 
within Organization B, where both physical and computer security levels were low and 
security threats were evident to users.  In this situation, users demonstrated exemplary 
behavior with their own passwords.  We would argue that the need-to-know principle should 
be jettisoned.  The main argument of its proponents is that by informing users about the 
rationale behind security mechanisms, along with real and potential threats to security, they 
may be lowering security by increasing the possibility of information leaks.  This attitude has 
lead to a two-fold problem: (a) users’ lack of security awareness, and (b) security 
departments’ lack of knowledge about users, producing security mechanisms and systems 
which are not usable.  These two factors lower users’ motivation to produce secure work 
practices.  This then reinforces security departments’ belief that users are “inherently 
insecure” and leads to the introduction of stricter mechanisms, which require more effort from 
users.  This vicious circle needs to be broken.  Communication between security departments 
and users is therefore often restricted to “ticking off” users caught circumventing the rules.  
  5This approach does not fit with modern distributed and networked organizations, which 
depend on communication and collaboration.  Users have to be treated as partners in the 
endeavor to secure an organization’s systems, not as the enemy within.  System security is 
one of the last areas in IT in which user-centered design and user training are not regarded as 
essential; this has to change.  
Users and password behavior 
Insecure work practices and low security motivation has been identified by research 
on information security as a major problem which must be addressed [2, 3, 6, 7].  The 
research presented here does, however, clearly identify the cause of these user-related 
problems. There is an implicit assumption that users are not inherently motivated to adopt 
secure behavior, but that such behavior can be achieved through drill and threats of 
punishment in case of non-compliance. Knowledge from psychology and human-computer 
interaction indicates that users’ behavior is likely to be more complex than a simple 
conditioned response.  This study demonstrates that users forced to comply with password 
mechanisms incompatible with work practices, may produce responses that circumvent the 
whole procedure.  Insecure work practices and low security motivation among users can be 
caused by security mechanisms and policy which take no account of users’ work practices, 
organizational strategies and usability.  These factors are pivotal in the design and 
implementation of most computer systems today.  Designers of security mechanisms must 
realize that they are the key to successful security system. Unless security departments 
understand how the mechanisms they design are used in practice, there will remain the danger 
that mechanisms which look secure on paper fail in practice.  
Recommendations 
The results from the studies reported have led to the formulation of the 
recommendations summarized in this section.  The construction of secure passwords 
can be supported through the recommendations under “password content” and 
“multiple passwords”.  Recommended ways of ensuring users comply with security 
mechanisms are described under “security perceptions” and “work practices”. 
 
Password Content 
•  Provide instruction and training on how to construct usable and secure 
passwords.  Users must be shown, proactively, how to construct memorable 
passwords which do not circumvent security mechanisms. 
•  Provide constructive on-line feedback during the password construction 
process, incorporating explanation if/when a password is rejected as 
insecure.  This should also help to refresh users’ knowledge of password 
design procedures.  
Multiple Passwords 
•  Asking users to remember multiple passwords decreases memorability and 
increases cognitive overheads associated with the password mechanism.  
•  If multiple passwords cannot be avoided, 4 or 5 is the maximum for 
unrelated, regularly used passwords which users can be expected to cope 
with. The number is lower if passwords are used infrequently.   
•  Related passwords are a frequently-used technique employed by users who 
have to remember multiple passwords, but within-list interference creates 
another, even worse, memory problem.  Where users have to work with a 
large number of different systems, single sign-on and physical security 
mechanisms such as smart cards should be considered to alleviate memory 
problems. 
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•  System security needs to be visible and seen to be taken seriously by the 
organization.  Providing feedback during the password construction process 
not only assists users in the construction of secure passwords, it also is an 
example of security in action and increases users’ awareness of system 
security and its importance.   
•  Inform users about existing and potential threats to the organization’s 
systems and sensitivity of information contained in them.  Awareness of 
threats and potential loss to the organization is the raison d’être for security 
mechanisms; without it, users are likely to perceive security mechanisms as 
tedious motions they have to go through.  The role of passwords in the fight 
against perceived threats should be made explicit. 
•  Users’ awareness of the importance of security and threats to it need to be 
maintained over time.  This requires a balancing act. Whilst we advise 
against “punishing” users who circumvent security mechanisms, such 
behavior needs to be detected and challenged in a constructive manner: if 
security is compromised and no action is taken, users tend to assume that “it 
doesn’t matter anyway”.  At the same time, an environment which gives the 
impression that its security mechanisms are invincible is likely to foster 
careless behavior among users, since the level of perceived threats to security 
is low. 
•  Provide users with guidance as to which systems and information are 
sensitive and why.  The current tendency is for security departments to treat 
all information as equally sensitive with as little explanation as possible.   
Without such indicators and guidance, users tend to make arbitrary 
judgments based on their own - usually patchy - knowledge and experience.  
Explain how security levels relate to different levels of information 
sensitivity.   
Work Practices 
•  Password mechanisms need to be compatible with organizational and work 
procedures.  Shared working and responsibility require users to perceive that 
they are using shared passwords, whereas information or work specific to 
individual users, should be protected by individual passwords. 
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